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CHEVRON AND SKIDMORE IN THE WORKPLACE:
UNHAPPY TOGETHER
James J. Brudney*
INTRODUCTION
In its approach to agency deference under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council,1 the U.S. Supreme Court often implicates the
relationship between Chevron and Skidmore v. Swift & Co.2 When
Chevron was decided, many judges and legal scholars anticipated that its
crisp two-stage test promoting deference to agency statutory construction
would occupy the field, jilting Skidmore and her older multifactor standard
favoring a softer form of deference.3 Other scholars at the time saw a
continuing role for Skidmore.4 And since United States v. Mead Corp.,5 the
Court‘s members apart from Justice Scalia regard it as only right that when
reviewing an agency‘s statutory interpretation, Chevron and Skidmore

* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. I thank Lawrence Baum and the
participants in the Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward Symposium,
organized by the Fordham Law Review, for their comments and insights. I am grateful to
Todd Lantz, Amanda Shami, Andrew Weisfeld, and the Fordham Law School Library for
excellent research assistance, and to Cynthia Lamberty-Cameron for fine secretarial support.
Fordham Law School contributed generous financial assistance.
1. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
2. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
3. See, e.g., Equal Emp‘t Opportunity Comm. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
259–60 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Antonin
Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511,
513, 521 (predicting broad application of Chevron and receding role for Skidmore-type
factors); Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 283,
297, 307–08 (1986) (D.C. Circuit judge describing Chevron as having cast serious doubt on
the multifactor sliding scale approach to judicial deference established under Skidmore, and
expressing approval for the new judicial philosophy); Thomas O. Sargentich, The Scope of
Judicial Review of Issues of Law: Chevron Revisited, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 277 (1992) (never
mentioning Skidmore); E. Donald Elliott & Peter H. Schuck, To the Chevron Station: An
Empirical Study of Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 984, 1024 (describing
Chevron as sweeping aside all other tests for determining deference to agency
constructions).
4. See, e.g., Clark Byse, Judicial Review of Administrative Interpretation of Statutes:
An Analysis of Chevron’s Step Two, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 255, 266 (1988); Michael Herz, Deference
Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J.
187, 208–09 (1992); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent,
101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992) (questioning the thesis that Chevron has supplanted earlier
deference regimes).
5. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
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should be thought about together—if not ―day and night,‖6 then at least on a
regular basis.
This Article examines developments since Chevron in the Court‘s
application of agency deference to its workplace law decisions.7 The
Article relies on a dataset of 730 decisions compiled for the 1969 through
2012 Terms, including 300 cases that predate Chevron. Its empirical
analysis focuses primarily on the Court‘s review of decisions by the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the Department of Labor (DOL).
These three agencies have long been responsible for implementing statutes
that occupy the major portion of the Court‘s workplace law docket.
Moreover, each agency operated under some form of judicial deference
regime well before 1984.
The results of this empirical review are surprising in several respects.
During the early Chevron era, conventional wisdom was that the decision
would or should result in agency deference becoming a more influential
factor in the judicial interpretation of statutory meaning. 8 Based on thirty
years of Supreme Court decisions in the workplace law area, however, this
has not happened. The Court‘s reliance on agency deference in comparison
to other interpretive resources is no greater since 1984 than it was before
Chevron.9
With respect to the major agencies implementing workplace statutes, the
Court‘s pre-Chevron approach to the NLRB arguably anticipated the broad
deference accorded to interpretive judgments under Chevron.10
Conversely, the Court‘s treatment of the EEOC prior to Chevron featured
the more searching review conventionally associated with Skidmore.11 This
distinction has persisted since 1984.12 Despite these primary associations—
6. See THE TURTLES, HAPPY TOGETHER (White Whale 1967) (―Imagine me and you, I
do: I think about you day and night. It‘s only right to think about the girl you love and hold
her tight, so happy together.‖).
7. For an overview of the symposium, see Peter M. Shane & Christopher J. Walker,
Foreword: Chevron at 30: Looking Back and Looking Forward, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 475
(2014). A number of other contributions to this symposium focus extensively on the
interaction between Chevron, Mead, and Skidmore more generally. See Jack M. Beermann,
Chevron at the Roberts Court: Still Failing After All These Years, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 731,
741–43 (2014); Kristin E. Hickman, The Three Phases of Mead, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 527,
528–30 (2014); Thomas W. Merrill, Step Zero After City of Arlington, 83 FORDHAM L. REV.
753, 756–58 (2014); Peter L. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 789,
792–93 (2014).
8. See generally supra note 3 and accompanying text.
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. See, e.g., Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 500–01 (1978); NLRB v. J.
Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 261–62 (1975); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221,
235–36 (1963); see also infra Part I.B (discussing deference to three main workplace law
agencies).
11. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 69–71 (1982); Gen. Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140–45 (1976); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 93–95
(1973). The Court‘s treatment of DOL interpretations prior to Chevron was more mixed:
some agency judgments received broad deference while others warranted more searching
review. See infra Part I.B.
12. See infra Part I.B.
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the EEOC with Skidmore and the NLRB with Chevron—the Court‘s proagency outcomes since 1984 have increased modestly for the EEOC
(52 percent versus 43 percent before Chevron) and decreased sharply for
the NLRB (52 percent versus 74 percent before Chevron).13 These findings
are in tension with the hypothesis that Chevron is linked to a heightened
respect for agency interpretive judgments.
A final dimension of the Chevron-Skidmore relationship explored here
involves the extent to which agency deference minimizes the role of
ideological preferences in judicial review. The conventional wisdom was
that Chevron‘s call for heightened deference could lead both liberal and
conservative wings of the Court to act in a more politically neutral fashion
than had been perceived under Skidmore. The Court‘s workplace law cases
are an appropriate subset from which to examine this issue, given the
fundamentally pro-employee nature of federal labor and employment
statutes.14 It turns out that in contrast to the fifteen years prior to Chevron,
agency win rates in the Chevron era are higher when the agency position
favors employers than when the agency supports employees.15 While this
result doubtless reflects in part the increasingly conservative composition of
the Court since 1986, it raises questions about the predictions that Chevron
would usher in an era of more ideologically neutral judicial deference.
Two post-Chevron decisions reviewing agency interpretations of the term
―supervisor‖ illustrate the extent to which discussion of formal deference
regimes may obscure more than enlighten. In NLRB v. Health Care &
Retirement Corp. of America,16 the Board over twenty-five years had
narrowly construed the National Labor Relations Act17 (NLRA) exemption
for ―supervisors‖ in the health care setting so as to exclude from the scope
of employee protection only nurses whose direction of other employees
involved hiring, discipline, and similar personnel responsibilities, not the
direction of those employees in the exercise of professional patient-care
judgments.18 The Court by a five-to-four vote rejected the agency‘s
construction and in doing so expanded considerably the Act‘s exemption
for supervisors.19 In Vance v. Ball State University,20 the EEOC over
fourteen years had construed ―supervisor‖ broadly in its Guidance covering
harassment by supervisors as ―agents‖ of the employer, to include
13. For more detailed discussion, see infra Part I.B.
14. Congress‘s broad legislative goals in this field have been to promote employee rights
and protections. In addition, the basic dichotomy between employer and employee/union
positions makes it relatively straightforward to identify and code Supreme Court results.
Thus, it is easier to assess whether agency deference is associated with liberal (or
conservative) outcomes in workplace law than for other subject areas that feature multiple
disparate constituencies, such as securities law or communications law. See James J.
Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL‘Y J. 221, 257–58 (2005).
15. See infra Part I.C.
16. 511 U.S. 571 (1994).
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2012).
18. Health Care, 511 U.S. at 574.
19. Id. at 584.
20. 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
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employees who help direct the daily work activities of other employees
even if they have no authority to make personnel decisions.21 The Court,
again by a five-to-four vote, rejected the agency construction and in doing
so excluded from the scope of employer liability the same group of
employees that the Justices had deemed to be supervisors under the NLRA.
The majority in Health Care never refers to Chevron at all, while the
dissent relies heavily on agency deference and invokes Chevron-type
analysis throughout. The majority in Vance dismisses Skidmore deference
in a footnote, while the dissent emphasizes the persuasiveness of a
Skidmore approach. The Court‘s opaque treatment of its two principal
deference-defining decisions is not unusual in the field of workplace law.22
And although a pair of individual cases cannot be deemed adequately
representative of the entire dataset, the Court‘s unwillingness to defer to an
agency construction of inconclusive statutory text is also far from unusual
where, as in these two decisions, the agency construction favors
employees.23
Part I of this Article examines the Court‘s workplace law decisions from
an empirical standpoint, focusing on its review of interpretive judgments by
the NLRB, the EEOC, and the DOL. Certain key findings reflect the
minimal or counter-suggestive impact of Chevron. Part II analyzes two
decisions, Health Care and Vance, from a doctrinal standpoint. This part
criticizes the Court‘s refusal to defer under either a Chevron or Skidmore
framework given the agencies‘ well-settled treatment of the ―supervisor‖
concept, a concept that is central both to the NLRA definition of a covered
―employee‖ and to employer responsibility and liability under
antidiscrimination law. Part III offers several possible explanations for
outcomes such as Health Care, Vance, and the broader results presented in
Part I. One explanation is ideological: any distinction between Chevron
and Skidmore deference may be vitiated by the reality that the Justices‘
policy preferences trump administrative law principles.
A second
explanation is methodological: the impact of Chevron may be overstated
because the Court has become so textually fixated that it focuses heavily on
a searching Step One review, and Skidmore factors are often part of that
review process. A final explanation is institutional: the Court‘s varied
practical experience with deference for the NLRB and the EEOC may
reflect the distinct nature of ongoing relations between those agencies and
Congress.
I. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS: NO NEW ERA OF DEFERENCE UNDER CHEVRON
The dataset of Supreme Court decisions consists of more than 730
workplace law cases decided over forty-four Terms: all seventeen Terms of

21. Id. at 2449–50.
22. See infra note 27 and accompanying text (indicating that only one-third of opinions
relying on agency deference invoke Chevron or Skidmore).
23. See infra Part I.C (indicating that Court win rate for workplace agencies is higher
when agency interpretation is pro-employer than pro-employee).

2014]

CHEVRON AND SKIDMORE IN THE WORKPLACE

501

the Burger Court, all nineteen Terms of the Rehnquist Court, and the first
eight Terms of the Roberts Court. The Court decided Chevron one-third of
the way through this period but because the Court docket was heaviest
during the Burger years, two-fifths of the total number of cases were
decided before Chevron. Cases are included in the dataset insofar as the
dispute before the Court affects employees or employers in their status as
employment-related actors.24
The decisions almost always feature
employees and/or unions in connection with employers, but they
occasionally involve the tax consequences or immigration effects of an
employment-based event.
In their comprehensive study of the Court‘s post-Chevron approaches to
deference, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer concluded that the Court‘s
deference regimes since 1984 have been more of a continuum than a
dichotomy.25 They also found that, despite the attendant volume of judicial
and scholarly dialogue, Chevron or Skidmore were applied in only 15
percent of more than 1000 decisions in which an agency interpretation was
at issue.26 Although this proportion is higher in my dataset, two-thirds of
the workplace law decisions in which the majority or the dissent relied on
agency deference do not refer either to Chevron or Skidmore.27 That said,
other workplace law decisions often characterize deference standards in
terms that are comparable to the expansive approach adopted in Chevron or
the narrower standard set forth in Skidmore.

24. The criteria used to construct and maintain this workplace law dataset are fully
described in James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 15–29 (2005) and more briefly in James J.
Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation: Comparing
Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231, 1248–49
(2009).
25. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference:
Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083,
1098 (2008).
26. Id. at 1089–90, 1098–99.
27. Of seventy-two decisions since 1984 in which the Court invoked agency deference
to help justify the result, 28 percent (twenty of seventy-two) identify Chevron, Skidmore, or
both. Of the thirty-seven principal dissenting opinions that expressly rely on agency
deference, 43 percent (sixteen of thirty-seven) refer to one or both of these leading decisions.
It is worth noting that Eskridge and Baer adopted a broader standard to construct a universe
of agency deference cases than is used for this dataset. An agency interpretation is ―at issue‖
in my workplace law dataset if the Court‘s majority opinion or principal dissent discussed a
publicly available agency interpretation as part of its ratio decidendi. That universe includes
the two reliance categories identified above plus any additional cases where the majority
considers and declines to rely on deference to agency judgments. Eskridge and Baer‘s
dataset encompasses those cases of explicit reliance or rejection by the Justices, but also
includes: (a) all cases in which the United States filed a brief interpreting the statute, and
(b) all cases in which a brief in the case revealed a publicly available agency interpretation
on point. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 25, at 1090 n.33; see also id. at 1112 n.108
(explaining that in 314 of their 1014 cases, the agency interpretation of the statute was
presented only in the Solicitor General‘s amicus brief).
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A. Agency Deference in Relation to Other Interpretive Resources:
Surprisingly Stable
The field of workplace law is heavily populated by aging statutes. Most
major laws are forty years old (Employee Security Income Retirement Act),
fifty years old (Title VII), sixty-five years old (Labor Management
Relations Act), even seventy-five or eighty years old (Fair Labor Standards
Act, National Labor Relations Act). Although some of these laws have
been amended since the late 1970s, there have been relatively few
modifications in the past two decades.28
One might reasonably infer that when a workplace statute has been in
place for several decades, the Supreme Court will have addressed most
first-order controversies about the meaning of key statutory provisions that
protect, permit, or prohibit specific employee or employer conduct.29
Accordingly, for second and third generation controversies, the Court might
look less often to original legislative intent or purpose—arguably reflected
in what the enacting Congress communicated through legislative history—
and more often to intervening levels of authority, especially the Court‘s
own precedent and also agency interpretations developed during the
implementation process.

28. Congress‘s rate of enacting statutes has declined in general since the arrival of
Republican control in the House starting in 1995. See Historical Statistics About Legislation
in the U.S. Congress, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (last
visited Oct. 19, 2014) (showing a sharp decline from an average of 667 enacted statutes in
the period 1975 through 1994 (94th through 103d Congress), to an average of 397 enacted
statutes from 1995 through 2014 (104th through 113th Congress)). The pace for workplace
statutes is slower than for many other fields, such as securities law, telecommunications law,
or consumer protection law. For example, in the last twenty years, Congress has enacted two
workplace statutes (2008 American with Disabilities Act (ADA) Amendments and 2009 Lily
Ledbetter Act), compared with its enactment of eleven securities law statutes, twelve
telecommunications statutes, and six consumer protection statutes. See CONGRESS.GOV,
https://beta.congress.gov/advanced-search (full advanced search strategy on file with
Fordham Law Review).
29. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) and McDonald v. Santa
Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976) (each addressing meaning of ―discrimination‖
under Title VII); NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962) and Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (each addressing meaning of ―bargain in good faith‖ under
NLRA); Walling v. Portland Terminal Co., 330 U.S. 148 (1947) and Rutherford Food Corp.
v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722 (1947) (each addressing meaning of ―employees‖ and
―employment‖ under FLSA).
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Table 1: Reliance on Interpretive Resources
1969–2013
Percentage of 350
Burger Court
Cases

Percentage of 299
Rehnquist Court
Cases

Percentage of 82
Roberts Court
Cases

49.1

62.5

65.9

1.4

6.0

14.6

Language Canons

12.0

24.4

28.0

Legislative History

46.6

28.1

20.7

Legislative Purpose

86.9

72.9

54.9

Legislative Inaction

5.7

6.0

4.9

Sup. Court Precedent

80.3

86.0

96.3

Common Law Precedent

9.4

15.4

20.7

Substantive Canons

8.3

15.4

19.5

Agency Deference

17.1

17.4

15.9

Resource
Textual Meaning
Dictionary

The data reported in Table 1 are consistent with this hypothesis in certain
respects. They disclose a marked decline in Supreme Court reliance on
both legislative history and legislative purpose, as well as a notable increase
in reliance on Supreme Court precedent. There is, however, no change in
the level of reliance on agency deference from the Burger Court through the
Rehnquist Court and the first eight Terms of the Roberts Court. Instead,
there has been a continuous and substantial increase in the Court‘s reliance
on more judicially grounded assets: canons, dictionaries, and common law
precedent as well as previously noted Supreme Court precedent.
The stability of the Court‘s approach to agency deference in relation to
other interpretive resources is surprising given early predictions
accompanying the Chevron standard30 and also the maturity of workplace
statutes. One might have anticipated that because Congress revisits most of
these laws only infrequently, and the NLRB, EEOC, and DOL have become
primary sources of politically accountable authority for statutory
implementation, the Court would be more willing to defer to agency
interpretations of aging statutory texts. On the other hand, perhaps the
Court‘s apparent lack of interest in deferring more often to agency rules or
guidance is related to its strikingly increased reliance on textual assets like
the dictionary and language canons. Those interpretive resources suggest
that the Court is more inclined toward de novo style review of agency

30. See generally Scalia, supra note 3; Sargentich, supra note 3.
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interpretations—whether framed as stage one Chevron analysis31 or simply
as a close reading of the contested text.
B. Deference to Key Workplace Law Agencies: Unexpected Changes
Three federal agencies are responsible for implementing the major
federal workplace statutes. The NLRB administers and litigates issues
related to a single labor relations statute. The EEOC is responsible for
providing guidance and litigation assistance on three major civil rights
statutes.32 The DOL oversees implementation of a wide range of labor
standards statutes.33 From 1984 to 2013, two-thirds of the Court‘s
workplace law decisions implicating agency deference involved these three
agencies.34
As noted earlier, the Supreme Court prior to Chevron had articulated a
generous approach to deference for NLRB adjudications.35 With respect to
questions of fact, the Court in 1951 construed the NLRA‘s ―substantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole‖36 standard to include a
recognition that the Board is ―one of those agencies presumably equipped
or informed by experience to deal with a specialized field of knowledge
[labor-management relations], whose findings within that field carry the
authority of an expertness which courts do not possess and therefore must
respect.‖37

31. See Scalia, supra note 3, at 521 (―One who finds more often (as I do) that the
meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws,
thereby finds less often that the triggering requirement for [Step Two] Chevron deference
exists.‖).
32. Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2012); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012).
33. These statutes include the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219
(2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461
(2012); Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2012); Mine
Safety and Health Act (MSHA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–965 (2012); Longshore and Harbor
Workers Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950 (2012); Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2109 (2012); and Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2012).
34. Of the 119 decisions in which the majority expressly relied on or rejected agency
deference during this period, DOL was the relevant agency in thirty cases, EEOC in twentyseven, and NLRB in twenty-one. The remaining decisions involved thirteen different
agencies, only one of which (IRS) was involved in as many as four decisions.
35. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f). Congress added the ―substantial evidence‖ standard in 1947 to
modify the original Wagner Act standard that Board findings ―if supported by evidence,
shall be conclusive.‖ The change parallels Congress‘s enactment of the ―substantial
evidence‖ standard as part of the 1946 Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)
(2012).
37. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951). Given the passage of
time and the range of factual settings presented by individual cases, the courts of appeals
have not applied this standard in a uniform way. Still, the Universal Camera standard has
supported an ongoing appellate court commitment to substantial deference on Board factual
findings, including but not limited to findings that turn on credibility determinations. See,
e.g., NLRB v. Horizons Hotel Corp., 49 F.3d 795, 799 (1st Cir. 1995); J. Huizinga Cartage
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With respect to questions of law, the Court in 1978 made clear that the
Board is entitled to special deference when interpreting provisions of the
NLRA. In Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB,38 the Court emphasized the
limited nature of judicial review on such questions:
It is the Board on which Congress conferred the authority to develop
and apply fundamental national labor policy. [Therefore the Board]
necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the interstices of
the broad statutory provisions. . . . The function of striking th[e] balance
[between conflicting legitimate interests] to effectuate national labor
policy is [a] . . . responsibility, which the Congress committed primarily
to the [NLRB] . . . . The judicial role is narrow: The rule which the
Board adopts is judicially reviewable for consistency with the Act, and for
rationality.39

This approach to agency deference on matters of statutory interpretation
is consonant with, and arguably anticipates, the second stage of Chevron
review announced six Terms later.
The Court‘s pre-Chevron stance on deference to EEOC interpretations of
Title VII40 was more constrained than its position toward the NLRB. As
explained by the Court, Congress in Title VII did not confer upon the
EEOC authority to promulgate substantive rules.41 Accordingly, agency
guidelines construing statutory meaning or legislative intent were not
entitled to the same weight as rules that Congress had declared to carry the
force of law. Instead, EEOC interpretations were best characterized as
informal agency views, entitled to Skidmore-level deference.42
The Court‘s pre-Chevron approach to DOL interpretations was
something of a hybrid. Most statutes give the DOL considerable
interpretive scope through grants of authority to issue regulations,43 and the
Co. v. NLRB, 941 F.2d 616, 619, 620–21 (7th Cir. 1991); Pergament United Sales, Inc. v.
NLRB, 920 F.2d 130, 138 (2d Cir. 1990).
38. 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
39. Id. at 500–01 (citing to NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 235–36 (1963)
and Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941)). The Court‘s reference to
Board ―rules‖ encompasses standards adopted through adjudication. As of 1978, the Board
had never engaged in notice-and-comment rulemaking, and the Court several years before
Beth Israel held that the Board may announce new doctrinal standards through adjudication
as well as rulemaking. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974).
40. Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
41. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975). The Gilbert Court noted that § 713(a) gives the EEOC
―authority from time to time to issue . . . suitable procedural regulations to carry out the
provisions of this subchapter,‖ but it concluded that this section does not confer authority to
interpret substantive statutory meaning. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141 n.20.
42. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 141–43. See EEOC v. Assoc. Dry Goods Corp., 449 U.S. 590,
600 n.17 (1981); Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 n.4 (1977); Trans World
Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 76 n.11 (1977). But cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 433–34 (1971) (observing that ―[t]he administrative interpretation of the Act by
the enforcing agency is entitled to great deference,‖ citing earlier non-Title VII decisions).
43. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (2012) (authorizing promulgation of occupational
safety or health standards); id. §§ 1029, 1135 (authorizing promulgation of regulations
related to employee retirement plans); id. § 438 (authorizing promulgation of regulations
related to union reporting and disclosure requirements).
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Court at times deferred to agency judgments undertaken pursuant to that
congressional authority.44 On the other hand, the DOL also interprets its
authorizing laws by using less formal mechanisms such as guidelines,
individual case determinations, or advisory opinions, and these
interpretations on occasion received less deferential judicial review prior to
1984.45
The varying pre-Chevron approaches to deference for these three major
workplace law agencies have essentially been carried forward under
Chevron. Based on Step Zero analysis, agency legal positions qualify for
Chevron deference if adopted pursuant to rule of law authority that has been
delegated to the agency by Congress.46 Although Congress has conferred
that force of law authority for NLRB interpretations adopted through
rulemaking, it has not done so in formal terms for agency interpretations
promulgated through adjudication.47 Yet the Court has expressly invoked
Chevron when reviewing NLRB adjudications on a number of occasions,48
and in general its level of deference to Board interpretations reflects a
Chevron framework rather than a Skidmore approach.49 The Court has
frequently invoked Chevron when explaining the deference it is prepared to
accord to an NLRB adjudication. The Court‘s deference discussion has
featured Chevron when it has affirmed Board adjudications under a Step
Two review50 and also when it has rejected Board adjudicatory positions
based on a more rigorous Step One–type analysis.51 Moreover, when
44. See, e.g., Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1980) (deferring to
Secretary‘s interpretation under Occupational Safety and Health Act); Local 3489, United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 313 (1977) (deferring to Secretary‘s
interpretation under Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act).
45. See Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers‘ Comp. Programs, 449 U.S.
268, 273–80 (1980) (relying on text and legislative history, and refusing to defer to series of
caselaw determinations by Benefits Review Board).
46. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001). See generally Thomas
W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 872 (2001).
47. See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 46, at 892.
48. See, e.g., NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 713–14 (2001); Holly
Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517 U.S. 392, 398–99, 408–09 (1996); ABF Freight Sys. v. NLRB,
510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994).
49. See NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, 484 U.S. 112,
123–24 (1987) (reviewing validity of promulgated regulation under Chevron Step Two, and
equating this test to traditional deference accorded to Board regarding agency interpretations
that are ―rational and consistent with the [Act]‖); Jonathan D. Hacker, Note, Are Trojan
Horse Union Organizers ―Employees‖?: A New Look at Deference to the NLRB’s
Interpretation of NLRA Section 2(3), 93 MICH. L. REV. 772, 775–76, 788–89 (1995)
(equating Chevron deference with traditional Board deference—broader than Skidmore).
50. See Ky. River Cmty. Care Inc., 532 U.S. at 713; Holly Farms Corp, 517 U.S. at 398–
99, 408–409; ABF Freight Sys., 510 U.S. at 324.
51. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148–49 (2002)
(declining to defer because of conflict between Board legal position and policies of another
federal law that Board lacks authority to enforce or administer); id. at 161 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Board‘s interpretation is reasonable hence warrants deference under
Chevron Step Two); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 539 (1992) (rejecting agency
position as based on ―erroneous legal foundations‖ with respect to scope and meaning of § 7
(citation omitted)); id. at 545 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that Board‘s interpretations
warrant deference under Chevron Step Two).
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relying on Chevron to support a Board regulation, the Court has made clear
that the Chevron Step Two standard—whether the interpretation is based on
a permissible construction of the text—is equivalent to the Court‘s preChevron deference when reviewing Board adjudicatory interpretations of
the Act.52
Congress has given the EEOC rule of law authority for the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) but not for Title VII, which has been the primary
implementation focus for the Court when reviewing agency
interpretations.53 As a result, the Court has at times applied Chevron when
reviewing EEOC interpretive judgments outside of Title VII. 54 More often,
however, the Justices have invoked a Skidmore framework when reviewing
EEOC determinations.55 Indeed, since 1984, the Court has never relied on
Chevron when reviewing EEOC interpretations of Title VII text. The
majority has opined on a number of occasions that agency interpretations of
Title VII are entitled only to Skidmore deference,56 and its refusal to invoke
Chevron occasionally has been criticized in a separate opinion.57 While the

52. See United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 23, 484 U.S. at 123–24
(citing to Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 42 (1987); Ford
Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 495, 497 (1979); and Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437
U.S. 483, 501 (1978)). Overall, the Court has expressly relied on Chevron in majority or
dissent in seven of twenty-one post-Chevron decisions reviewing NLRB: five majority and
two dissent. The Justices have not invoked Skidmore at all when reviewing NLRB
decisions.
53. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2012) (conferring rulemaking authority under Age
Discrimination in Employment Act), and 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2012) (conferring rulemaking
authority under Americans with Disabilities Act), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g) (reciting
EEOC powers under Title VII which do not include rule of law authority). Supreme Court
decisions involving the EEOC primarily address Title VII as opposed to the ADEA or ADA:
this is true for 93 percent of decisions prior to 1984 and 48 percent since 1984.
54. See, e.g., General Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2003)
(applying Chevron framework to agency interpretation of ADEA); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 84 (2002) (applying Chevron framework to agency interpretation of
ADA).
55. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256–57 (1991) (applying
Skidmore framework to agency interpretation of Title VII); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S.
Ct. 2434, 2443 n.4 (2013) (same); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517,
2533 (2013) (same); Ky. Ret. Sys. v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 135, 150 (2008) (applying Skidmore
framework to agency interpretation of ADEA). Overall, the Court has expressly relied on
Skidmore in majority or dissent in nine of twenty-seven post-Chevron decisions reviewing
the EEOC: four majority and five dissent. The Court has relied on Chevron when reviewing
three EEOC decisions—two construing the ADEA and one under the ADA.
56. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); Int‘l Ass‘n of
Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 517–18 (1986); Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S.
at 256–57; Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 642 n.11 (2007)
(declining to extend Chevron deference); see also Kasten v. Saint-Gobin Performance
Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335 (2011) (according Skidmore deference to EEOC
guidelines under Equal Pay Act); Clackemas Gastroenterology Assoc. v. Wells, 538 U.S.
440, 448–49 (2003) (according Skidmore deference to EEOC guidelines under the ADA).
57. See EEOC v. Commercial Office Prod. Co., 486 U.S. 107, 125 (1988) (O‘Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 259–60
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Gen. Dynamics v.
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 605–06 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (concluding there is no need to
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Court has invoked Chevron when considering the scope of deference to
EEOC interpretations of the ADEA and ADA, it has not been entirely
consistent on this score.58 In any event, the Agency‘s Title VII
interpretations have been the primary focus of EEOC decisions reviewed by
the Court since Chevron.59
The Court‘s post-Chevron approach to the DOL continues to reflect a
hybrid approach. The Justices often apply the Chevron test, especially for
statutes where the agency‘s interpretation is conveyed through some form
of regulation.60 But there are also a certain number of Skidmore-type
analyses, usually when the DOL interpretation is not as formal, such as an
advisory opinion, a party or amicus brief, or an interpretive bulletin, rather
than a regulation.61
Against this backdrop, one might expect that the Court‘s willingness to
defer to the NLRB and DOL would increase given its professed
commitment to applying a Chevron-type analysis. By contrast the Court‘s
record on deference to the EEOC might be expected to remain basically
unchanged in light of its continuation of a Skidmore-type approach.
Yet as Table 2 indicates, the results differ markedly from those
expectations. When invoking agency deference as a probative resource, the
Court is less likely to support agency interpretations since Chevron than it
was in the prior fifteen years—even though the earlier period is thought to
be characterized by more rigorous judicial review of agency interpretive
decide if Chevron applies to ADEA regulation because the EEOC is correct under Step One
and surely reasonable under Step Two).
58. Compare, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 84 (2002) (applying
Chevron deference to an EEOC regulation interpreting ADA text), and Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys.
of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 170–71 (1989) (applying Chevron Step One to reject
deference under ADEA), and Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (applying Chevron deference to an EEOC
regulation interpreting ADEA although majority does not rely on or mention Chevron), with
Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008) (according Skidmore deference
to consistent EEOC interpretations of ADEA provision), and Clackemas, 538 U.S. at 448–51
(according Skidmore deference to EEOC interpretation of ADA provision). Some of the
tensions involving the ADEA and the ADA may be explained by reference to the Step Zero
rule of law distinction under Mead, but not all of them. See, e.g., Smith, 544 U.S. 228.
59. Of twenty-seven post-Chevron decisions in which the Court reviewed an EEOC
interpretation and expressly invoked agency deference, thirteen involved Title VII, seven
involved the ADA, and seven involved the ADEA. Of fourteen pre-Chevron decisions in
which the Court examined agency deference to EEOC interpretations, all but one involved
Title VII.
60. See, e.g., Long Island Care at Home Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173–74 (2007)
(FLSA); Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 696–700 (1991) (Black Lung Act);
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 116–17 (1989) (ERISA); see also Pittston Coal Grp.
v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105, 113–17 (1988) (Black Lung Act; agency interpretation rejected at
Chevron Step One).
61. See, e.g., Kasten, 131 S. Ct. at 1335–36 (2011) (amicus brief interpreting FLSA
text); Yates v. Hendon, 541 U.S. 1, 17–18 (2004) (advisory opinion construing ERISA
provision); Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 521 U.S. 121, 136 (1997) (party brief
interpreting LHWCA); see also Christensen v. Harris Cnty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)
(denying Skidmore deference to agency opinion letter construing FLSA); John Hancock Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 106–09 (1993) (denying Skidmore
and Chevron deference to agency interpretive bulletin interpreting ERISA).

2014]

CHEVRON AND SKIDMORE IN THE WORKPLACE

509

positions. The Court‘s record of relying on deference to the EEOC
increased slightly in the post-Chevron period. This difference is modest,
however, and is consistent with the Court reviewing a higher proportion of
EEOC interpretations involving the ADEA and ADA, statutes in which
Congress conferred rule of law interpretive authority on the agency.62
Table 2: Deference to Three Primary Workplace Law Agencies
Pre-Chevron

Post-Chevron

Agency Support

Agency Rejection

Agency Support

Agency Rejection

EEOC

43% (6/14)

57% (8/14)

52% (14/27)

48% (13/27)

NLRB

74% (29/39)

26% (10/39)

52% (11/21)

48% (10/21)

DOL

83% (5/6)

17% (1/6)

67% (20/30)

33% (10/30)

Overall

68% (40/59)

32% (19/59)

58% (45/78)

42% (33/78)

Of greater interest is the Court‘s declining record of support for
interpretations rendered by the NLRB and DOL—the two agencies
associated with Chevron-level deference. The Court has been clear that
NLRB adjudications and rules receive Chevron-style review, and yet the
Court has been notably more willing to reject deference to the Board‘s
interpretive judgments since Chevron. With respect to the DOL, the preChevron numbers are small but the Court since Chevron has often declined
to follow DOL interpretations. In doing so, the Court has invoked Chevron
Step One analysis on some occasions and Skidmore lack of persuasive
power on others.63 Still, the Court‘s rejection of agency interpretations by
the DOL and NLRB has most often cited to neither Chevron nor Skidmore
but rather to the basic inadequacy of the agency‘s legal position.64
62. See supra note 53 (providing data on Court‘s review of decisions involving EEOC);
supra note 58 (citing opinions applying Chevron deference under ADA and ADEA). Still,
there are not many such cases, and occasionally the EEOC is rejected under Chevron. See
Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989) (rejecting agency
interpretation of ADEA at Step One).
63. For Chevron Step One rejections, see, for example, Pittston Coal Group, 488 U.S. at
113–17; Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 535 U.S. 81, 86–96 (2002). For Skidmore
rejections, see, for example, Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587; John Hancock, 510 U.S. at 106–
09.
64. For NLRB interpretations not deferred to, see, for example, New Process Steel L.P.
v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct 2635 (2010); NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., 511 U.S. 571
(1994); Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988). For DOL interpretations
rejected, see, for example, Kloeckner v. Solis, 133 S. Ct. 596 (2012); Director, Office of
Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994).
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A possible factor contributing to a post-Chevron decline in the Court‘s
willingness to defer is an increase in dissonance between the political
orientation of agencies and the Court since 1984. The Court‘s membership
has grown steadily more conservative starting in 1969.65 But while the
presidency was occupied primarily by Republicans from 1969 to 1984, it
has been more evenly divided between Democrats and Republicans since
1984.66 One way to examine the possible influence of Supreme Court
partisanship in the Chevron era is to consider agency win rates before the
Court when an agency favors employees versus when it supports
employers.
C. Agency Deference and the Court’s Ideological Preferences:
Favoring Employers
In the wake of Chevron, some scholars anticipated that the new form of
deference based on respect for politically accountable agencies would likely
diminish the result-oriented nature of judicial review applied to agency
interpretations.67 Recently, however, empirical work suggests that in the
Chevron era, conservative Justices are more likely to validate conservative
agency interpretations than liberal ones, and liberal Justices are similarly
likely to agree with liberal agency interpretations more often than
conservative ones.68 In addition, Margaret Lemos in her study of Supreme
Court and agency interpretations of Title VII reported that the EEOC is
notably more liberal (i.e., pro-employee) than the Supreme Court when both
institutions address the same Title VII issues: EEOC interpretations have
been liberal more than 90 percent of the time while Court positions have
been liberal in 64 percent of the cases.69 My own previous work on the
NLRB and the Court is broadly consistent with Lemos‘s findings. The

65. From 1969 to 1984, all six new appointments to the Court were made by Republican
presidents. Since 1984, five of the nine new appointments have been made by Republican
presidents. Moreover, both Republican and Democrat appointees are viewed as more
conservative than predecessors of the same partisan persuasion. See Nate Silver, Supreme
Court May Be Most Conservative in Modern History, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Mar. 29, 2012,
8:06 PM), http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/supreme-court-may-be-mostconservative-in-modern-history/. See generally Andrew D. Martin, Kevin M. Quinn & Lee
Epstein, The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1275,
1300–04 (2005).
66. From 1969 to 1984, Republican Presidents occupied the White House for twelve of
sixteen years. Since 1984, Republicans have been President for sixteen years (1985 to 1992
and 2001 to 2008) and Democrats for fourteen years (1993 to 2000 and 2009 to 2014).
Assuming the Court‘s docket through June 2013 would likely include agency rulings only
through June 2011, that is still a ratio of sixteen to eleven.
67. See generally Scalia, supra note 3; Starr, supra note 3; Cass R. Sunstein, Law and
Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990).
68. See Connor N. Raso & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Chevron As A Canon, Not A
Precedent: An Empirical Study of What Motivates Justices in Agency Deference Cases, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1727, 1786–89 (2010); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges
Make Regulatory Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823,
831–47 (2006); Eskridge & Baer, supra note 25, at 1155.
69. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate:
Judicial and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 389–90 (2010).
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Board‘s determinations that employers violated employee rights (a liberal
agency determination) under the core statutory provision prohibiting
employer coercion or discrimination have been sustained 57 percent of the
time since 1970.70 This agency success record is substantially lower than
the 83 percent affirmance rate the NLRB enjoyed for violations under the
same core provision from 1940 through 1969.71
Although the politicized valence accompanying Supreme Court review of
agency rulings is not a huge surprise, an account based only on judicial
ideology is likely to omit relevant institutional considerations. The
divergence between the Supreme Court and the EEOC or NLRB on
disputes concerning employer liability is doubtless due in part to the Court
becoming increasingly conservative since 1970. At the same time, the
divergence also may be attributable to a degree of mission conflict between
the Court and these workplace agencies. The EEOC and NLRB tend to
interpret their authorizing statutes, whether consciously or not, with a goal
of ―giv[ing] energy and effectiveness to the legislative programs for which
they are responsible.‖72 By contrast, the Supreme Court must interpret
these same statutory provisions in the context of a larger legal landscape,
including the need to accommodate new and possibly impinging statutory
provisions or constitutional law developments.73
Of course, workplace agencies are not monolithic when construing
provisions of their authorizing statute. Agency interpretations support
employer legal positions a certain amount of the time even if they more
often construe the statute as favoring employees. This pattern invites an
examination of whether the Court‘s deference to the three key agencies is
higher when agency interpretation favors employers as opposed to
employees. Table 3 reports results.

70. See James J. Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of the Workplace,
74 TEX. L. REV. 1563, 1574 n.43 (1996) (reporting that Board determinations of employer
liability under § 8(a) of the NLRA were upheld by the Supreme Court in twenty-one of
thirty-six cases between 1970 and 1994). Since 1994, six additional Board determinations of
§ 8(a) employer liability have been reviewed by the Supreme Court: three affirmed and
three reversed. Thus the Court has affirmed twenty-four of forty-two Board pro-employee
determinations (57 percent) under the core NLRA provision since the start of the Burger era.
71. See id. at 1574 n.43 (reporting that Board determinations of employer liability under
§ 8(a) were affirmed by the Court in fifty of sixty cases between 1940 and 1969).
72. Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency-Centered or Court-Centered Administrative Law? A
Dialogue with Richard Pierce on Agency Statutory Interpretation, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 889,
891 (2007).
73. See generally James J. Brudney, A Famous Victory: Collective Bargaining
Protections and the Statutory Aging Process, 74 N.C. L. REV. 939, 1023–30 (1996). For a
more recent example of this accommodation process, see Hoffman Plastic Compounds v.
NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 146–52 (2002) (limiting NLRB remedies in light of subsequently
enacted immigrations laws). For additional discussion, see infra Part III.
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Table 3: Supreme Court Win Rates
for Pro-Employee Versus Pro-Employer Agency Determinations
Pre-Chevron Agency Ruling
For Employee

For Employer

Post-Chevron Agency Ruling
For Employee

For Employer

EEOC

50% (6/12)

0% (0/2)

48% (10/21)

67% (4/6)

NLRB

71% (20/28)

82% (9/11)

56% (10/18)

67% (2/3)

DOL

80% (4/5)

100% (1/1)

57% (8/14)

75% (12/16)

Overall

67% (30/45)

71% (10/14)

53% (28/53)

72% (18/25)

Although the number of observations is quite small in several agency
categories, the overall direction is fairly clear. Considering the three
agencies together over the fifteen Terms before Chevron, the Court is
similarly inclined to affirm agency rulings favoring employees and rulings
supporting employers. By contrast, the Court evidences a distinctly greater
inclination toward deference for pro-employer agency rulings in the postChevron era. For the entire period of forty-four Terms, the Court is
somewhat more likely to affirm pro-employer agency determinations than
pro-employee ones.74
The Court‘s increasingly conservative ideological orientation starting in
1969 helps to explain its growing preference for pro-employer agency
determinations. But it is worth noting the Court‘s essentially identical
affirmance rate for pro-employer and pro-employee agency outcomes
during the pre-Chevron era, a period when federal agencies were uniformly
part of Republican administrations. Further, agency rulings that have
reached the Court since Chevron—during a bipartisan presidential period—
are more conservative (pro-employer) than in the pre-Chevron years,75 and
the agencies‘ pro-employer shift between the two periods is comparable to
the Court‘s movement in the same direction.76 These findings suggest that

74. Between 1969 and 2013 the Court affirmed fifty-eight of ninety-eight pro-employee
agency rulings (59 percent) and twenty-eight of thirty-nine pro-employer agency rulings (72
percent).
75. The three primary workplace agencies together favored employers in fifteen of fiftynine pre-Chevron cases (25 percent) and twenty-six of seventy-eight post-Chevron cases
(33 percent).
76. The Court‘s pro-employer results in cases implicating agency deference rose from
twenty-four of fifty-nine pre-Chevron cases (41 percent) to forty-three of seventy-eight postChevron cases (55 percent). This pro-employer direction is based on cases in which the
Court exercised its discretionary jurisdiction to grant certiorari and issue decisions. The
Court‘s trend does not necessarily indicate whether these three agencies have become more
pro-employer in the overall volume of their rulings.
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factors besides ideological orientation are contributing to the Court‘s proemployer tilt during the Chevron era.
II. THE COURT‘S RELUCTANCE TO DEFER: TWO DOCTRINAL EXAMPLES
The empirical results presented in Part I indicate that in the workplace
law area, Chevron has not led the Court to accord agency deference more
weight; or to defer more often to agencies deserving of Chevron rather than
Skidmore deference; or to defer to agencies on a more ideologically neutral
basis. Assuming, therefore, that Chevron has not ushered in a new era of
robust deference at the Supreme Court level, how should one approach the
Court‘s deference decisions in doctrinal terms?
Given constraints of space, this part does not attempt a comprehensive
response. Instead, it reviews two decisions in which the Court declined to
defer—once to the NLRB and once to the EEOC. The two decisions are
linked in that they each address agency interpretations of the word
―supervisor‖ under their respective authorizing statutes. The NLRB
interpretation of a statutory definition was developed in an effort to identify
the scope of protected coverage for employees under the NLRA. The
EEOC interpretation of a term derived from statutory text was formulated to
establish the scope of liability for employers under Title VII. The Court
had the opportunity to invoke Chevron deference under the NLRA and
Skidmore deference under Title VII but declined to do so in each instance.
While no pair of decisions can adequately illustrate the trends identified in
Part I, these two cases reflect certain key aspects of the Court‘s direction,
and they invite further inquiry on a larger scale.
A. Invoking Plain Language to Reject Chevron-Type Deference
In Health Care, the Court had to decide how broadly to construe the
NLRA‘s exemption for supervisors. The Board had determined that four
licensed practical nurses at a nursing home, who were responsible for
monitoring and directing the work of aides on evenings and weekends, were
focused ―on the well-being of the residents rather than of the employer.‖77
The agency went on to hold that these four nurses were covered employees,
not excluded ―supervisors,‖ based on its settled interpretation of that
statutory term.78
The Act‘s definition of ―supervisor‖ encompasses individuals who have
authority, ―in the interest of the employer,‖ to hire, discipline, discharge, or
―responsibly to direct‖ other employees.79 The Board had long construed
this definition, and its key quoted components, to cover the interest of the
employer in terms of personnel relations but not professional performance.
Thus, nurses were deemed to be supervisors if, ―in addition to performing
their professional duties and responsibilities, they also possessed the

77. See NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 574–75 (1994).
78. Id. at 574.
79. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2012) (emphasis added).
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authority to make effective recommendations which affected the job status
and pay of‖ health care employees working with them.80 But nurses‘
direction of other, less-skilled employees regarding the work to be done for
patients was ―solely a product of their highly developed professional skills
and do[es] not, without more, constitute an exercise of supervisory
authority in the interest of their Employer.‖81
The Board‘s approach relied heavily on the fact that the 1947 Congress,
while adding an exclusion from coverage for supervisors, had
simultaneously added protection for a class of employees called
―professionals.‖82 Professional employees routinely give direction to other
less-skilled workers whose performance is required if the professional is to
carry out her assignments.83 Were professionals to be acting ―in the interest
of the employer‖ simply because they have authority to tell other employees
what tasks to perform, this respondeat superior–type approach would
effectively eliminate the vast majority of professionals from the Act‘s
coverage.
Apart from relying on the text and structure of the 1947 amendments, the
Board invoked more recent 1974 legislative history accompanying an
extension of the NLRA to cover additional health care establishments. The
1974 House and Senate committee reports emphasized the narrow meaning
of ―supervisor‖ in relation to health care professionals. The reports
specifically observed that the committees had declined requests to amend
the definition of ―supervisor‖ to exclude various health care professionals
because of the Board‘s established adjudicatory position. Both reports
emphasized that
the Board has carefully avoided applying the definition of ―supervisor‖ to
a health care professional who gives direction to other employees in the
exercise of professional judgment, which direction is incidental to the
professional‘s treatment of patients, and thus is not the exercise of
supervisory authority in the interest of the employer.84

The reports concluded that the Board should continue to follow this
interpretive approach.85 The Supreme Court in an earlier case, NLRB v.
Yeshiva University,86 had relied on this same 1974 legislative history,

80. Doctors‘ Hosp. of Modesto, Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 950, 951−52 (1970), enforced, 489
F.2d. 772 (9th Cir. 1973).
81. Id. at 951.
82. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (defining ―professional employee‖).
83. See NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461, 1465 (7th Cir. 1983).
84. S. REP. NO. 93-766, at 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3946, 3951; H.R.
REP. NO. 93-1051, at 7 (1974).
85. S. REP. NO. 93-766, at 6 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3946, 3951; H.R.
REP. NO. 93-1051, at 7 (1974). The phrase ―responsibly to direct,‖ was added as an
amendment to the definition of ―supervisor‖ on the Senate floor during the 1947 debates.
The floor exchange also makes clear that its author intended the phrase to cover responsible
direction reflecting managerial authority, as distinct from minor supervision stemming from
an employee‘s greater skill or experience. See 93 CONG. REC. 4677−78 (1947) (statement of
Sen. Flanders).
86. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
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invoking Congress‘s ―express approv[al]‖ of the Board test that
distinguished between supervisors and health care professionals.87
To be sure, plausible arguments are available to counter the Board‘s
interpretation. The phrase ―in the interest of the employer‖ can be
construed to apply to an employee‘s responsible direction of others beyond
the exercise of hiring, firing, or disciplinary authority. And the Court‘s
Yeshiva decision, which dealt with the status of tenured faculty under the
NLRA, also includes discussion that minimizes the professional-supervisor
tension by equating the professional interests of university faculty with the
university‘s governance interests as an employer.88
The existence of reasonable arguments on each side should in principle
lead to a Chevron Step Two analysis. Whatever the merits of the
competing analyses summarized above, it is a considerable stretch to
contend that the terms ―responsibly to direct‖ and ―in the interest of the
employer‖ as applied to health care professionals reflect ―the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress,‖ or reveal that ―Congress has
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.‖89 It is far more reasonable
to conclude that ―the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to th[is]
specific issue,‖ in which case the agency‘s construction should be deferred
to if rational and ―based on a permissible construction of the statute.‖90
The Court, however, held that the Board‘s well-settled interpretation of
the definition of ―supervisor‖ was at odds with the plain language of the
Act.91 Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice Kennedy never
mentioned Chevron, but his Step One–type analysis concluded that the
ordinary meaning of the phrase ―in the interest of the employer‖
encompassed all acts by an employee ―within the scope of employment or
on the authorized business of the employer.‖92
Justice Kennedy
acknowledged that this reading, broadly excluding supervisors, created
tension with the Act‘s inclusion of professionals as employees, but he
dismissed the Board‘s effort to resolve that tension as a distortion of the
plain statutory language.93
Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, adopted a Step Two–type approach, also
without adverting to Chevron deference. She observed that Congress had
effectively delegated to the Board in the first instance the task of separating
excluded ―supervisors‖ from included ―professionals.‖94 She further noted
that the Board‘s approach to this interpretive issue focused on the purposes
of the NLRA exception for supervisors, as explained in detail in the 1947
87. Id. at 690 n.30.
88. Id. at 688.
89. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984).
90. Id. at 843.
91. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571, 578–79 (1994).
92. Id. at 578.
93. Id. at 581. The majority also discounted any reliance on the legislative history,
characterizing the committee report language invoked by the Board as isolated and without
authority. Id. at 581−82.
94. See id. at 585 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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legislative history.95 Finally, she explained how the Board‘s approach
harmonizing Congress‘s twin policies—including professionals while
excluding supervisors—was manifested in a series of decisions covering a
wide array of white-collar employees besides health care professionals.96
Taking these factors into account, Justice Ginsburg concluded that it was
difficult to regard the agency‘s interpretation applied to diverse professional
groups over many years as anything less than rational and consistent with
the Act.97 As predicted by the dissent, one result of the Court‘s decision
has been the exclusion of large numbers of professionals from the Act‘s
protections.98
B. Invoking Plain Language to Reject Skidmore-Type Deference
In Vance, the Court addressed the issue of vicarious employer liability
for workplace harassment by a supervisor.99 The question of who qualifies
as a ―supervisor‖ for purposes of the vicarious liability rule involved an
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent as well as statutory text. Title
VII does not define or use the term ―supervisor‖; it also does not expressly
refer to liability for hostile environment sexual harassment. But the EEOC
in its 1980 Guidelines had determined that harassment leading to noneconomic injury may qualify as unlawful discrimination under Title VII.100
In 1986, the Supreme Court endorsed this determination in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson.101 The Meritor Court also endorsed the EEOC
position that Congress, having defined ―employer‖ to include ―any agent of
an employer,‖ expected courts to look to agency principles for guidance on
when employers may be held liable for such harassment.102 The majority
95. See id. at 587–88.
96. Id. at 590–92 (referring to pharmacists, librarians, social workers, architects, and
engineers).
97. Id. at 599. Ginsburg went on to insist that the agency‘s interpretation was required
by the Act, implying that the Board position could be upheld under Chevron Step One as
well as Step Two. Id. at 598–99.
98. On September 29, 2006, the NLRB issued a trilogy of decisions that sought to refine
the Court‘s analysis in determining supervisory status under the NLRA. The decisions—In
re Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 686 (2006), In re Croft Metals, Inc., 348
N.L.R.B. 717 (2006), and In re Beverly Enters.-Minn., Inc., 348 N.L.R.B. 727 (2006)—
excluded many of the challenged individuals from exercising their union rights. In one study
anticipating the potential effects of these cases, employee rights advocates determined that,
depending on the NLRB‘s application of its reasoning, the cases ―[c]ould strip 8 million
more workers of their right to participate in a union and bargain collectively, adding to the
approximately 8.6 million first-line supervisors that the GAO estimates have already been
excluded by prior interpretations of the NLRA.‖ ROSS EISENBREY & LAWRENCE MISHEL,
ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, SUPERVISOR IN NAME ONLY: UNION RIGHTS OF EIGHT MILLION
WORKERS AT STAKE IN LABOR BOARD RULING (2006), available at
http://www.epi.org/publication/ib225/. This fear was similar to that expressed by the dissent
in Oakwood Healthcare, which stated that the majority‘s decision could ―create a new class
of workers under Federal labor law: workers who have neither the genuine prerogatives of
management, nor the statutory rights of ordinary employees.‖ 348 N.L.R.B. at 700.
99. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013).
100. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2013).
101. 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
102. See id. at 72.
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relied on Skidmore deference with respect to both of these conclusions,
observing that the EEOC Guidelines constituted an appropriate ―body of
experience and informed judgment.‖103 Twelve years later, the Court in
two separate decisions applied traditional agency law principles to hold that
an employer may be liable for hostile environment discrimination caused by
a supervisor.104 Neither decision, however, directly addressed the degree of
authority over the victim that a fellow employee must possess in order to be
classified as a supervisor.105
Following the Court‘s decisions in Ellerth and Faragher, two separate
views emerged regarding the meaning of a ―supervisor‖ for purposes of
imputing liability for hostile environment harassment. One view followed
the reasoning set forth in an EEOC Guidance issued in June 1999, twelve
months after the Supreme Court decisions.106 The EEOC concluded that
federal employment discrimination statutes do not define ―supervisor,‖ and
principles of agency law—applicable through the statutory definition of
―employer‖107—cannot mechanically determine whether an individual has
sufficient authority to qualify as a supervisor for purposes of vicarious
liability.108 The Commission considered both the purposes of Title VII and
related antidiscrimination statutes, and the reasoning of the Court‘s
harassment decisions, to conclude that a supervisor included not only an
individual with authority to take tangible personnel actions but also
someone with authority to direct an employee‘s daily work activities.109
The EEOC Guidance took close account of the Court‘s analyses in Ellerth
and Faragher; the agency then adhered to the Guidance position
consistently for fourteen years, and its position or analysis was followed by
a number of lower courts.110
A second view as to the meaning of ―supervisor,‖ also endorsed by a
number of lower courts, limited supervisors to those authorized to take
tangible personnel actions. These courts too invoked the analyses from
Ellerth and Faragher, although they did not discuss their reasons for
departing from the EEOC Guidance or even refer to the Guidance at all in
connection with their analyses.111

103. Id. at 65.
104. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
105. The issue was not directly presented in the Ellerth and Faragher cases. See Vance v.
Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2447 (2013); id. at 2457 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
106. EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL
HARASSMENT BY SUPERVISORS, available at 1999 WL 33305874 (June 18, 1999).
107. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
108. EEOC, supra note 106.
109. Id. at *3–4.
110. See, e.g., Mack v. Otis Elevator Co., 326 F.3d 116, 127 (2d Cir. 2003) (expressly
relying on the Guidance); Whitten v. Fred‘s, Inc., 601 F.3d 231, 245–47 (4th Cir. 2010)
(relying on same analysis as set forth in the Guidance); Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA,
133 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1266 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (same).
111. See Noviello v. City of Bos., 398 F.3d 76, 96 (1st Cir. 2005); Weyers v. Lear
Operations Corp., 359 F.3d 1049, 1057 (8th Cir. 2004). The Noviello court invoked
Skidmore deference for a separate issue, relying on an EEOC Compliance Manual
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The Supreme Court held that the EEOC‘s well-settled definitional
approach to the term ―supervisor‖ was at odds with the framework created
under Ellerth and Faragher.112 Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice
Alito insisted there was ―no hint in either [decision]‖ that the Court had
contemplated any meaning beyond authority to take tangible employment
actions.113 He quoted from Ellerth‘s statement distinguishing coworkers
from supervisors because they were capable of inflicting psychological
harm but not of docking someone‘s pay or demoting a fellow employee.114
At the same time, Justice Alito declined to credit the Court‘s discussion in
Faragher referring to a coworker with authority to control subordinates‘
daily work assignments as a supervisor.115 He went on to reject the EEOC
approach as too ambiguous to establish a meaningful limitation on
employer liability, ―[one of] the objectives of Title VII,‖116 and as
presuming a ―highly hierarchical management structure‖ that was ―out of
touch with the realities of the [modern] workplace.‖117
Agency deference is hardly the equivalent of a blank check, and the
EEOC Guidance at issue in Vance had interpreted prior Supreme Court
decisions (a realm in which the Court has superior authority), as well as a
gap in the statutory text. Nonetheless, from the lengthy majority and
dissenting opinions (and also the sharp division in the circuits), it is
apparent that each side relies heavily on its reading of Ellerth and
Faragher, and on its understanding of the purpose of Title VII. The dissent
additionally invokes the interpretive resource of agency deference.
In this regard, it is worth noting that notwithstanding Justice Alito‘s
concerns about its ambiguity, the EEOC Guidance recognizes a number of
specific limits on the scope of supervisory authority while directing daily
activities.118 In addition, the Guidance has governed the agency‘s
enforcement judgments consistently since 1999, including in numerous

interpretation but the court was silent with respect to the EEOC Guidance on vicarious
supervisory liability. 398 F.3d at 90. The Weyers court also did not address the EEOC
Guidance.
112. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2443–48 (2013).
113. Id. at 2448.
114. Id. (quoting Burlington Indus. Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998)).
115. See id. at 2458 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
524 U.S. 775, 780 (1998)). Justice Alito concluded that because the employer in Faragher
had never disputed the supervisory status of its employee who had no hiring or disciplinary
authority but rather ―was ‗responsible for making the lifeguards‘ daily assignments, and for
supervising their work and fitness training,‘‖ this status had not been a relevant consideration
in the Court‘s earlier decision. Id. at 2446–47 (majority opinion) (quoting Faragher, 524
U.S. at 780).
116. Id. at 2449.
117. Id. at 2452. This out of touch, hierarchical structure, of course, was precisely what
the Court had embraced in Health Care as the unambiguous meaning of ―responsibly to
direct . . . in the interest of the employer‖ under the NLRA. See supra notes 92–93 and
accompanying text.
118. See EEOC, supra note 106, at *4 (discussing limits based on job function rather than
job title, taking account of temporary authorizations, direction of a limited number of tasks,
and the role of relaying other officials‘ instructions regarding work assignments).
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briefs filed in the appellate courts,119 and the Court has often recognized the
relevance of long-term consistency in the Skidmore setting.120 Finally, in
relation to the asserted clarity of the Ellerth and Faragher treatment of
supervisor, several Supreme Court decisions between 1998 and 2013
recognized the meaning of ―supervisor‖ under Title VII as extending to
employees who direct duties, not simply those with authority to take
tangible employment actions.121
The juxtaposition of the Court‘s analyses in Vance and Health Care is
more than a little ironic, even though they deal with two separate statutes.
The Court in Health Care insisted that the key terms defining ―supervisor‖
had to be given broad scope to reflect ordinary meaning. What was
―ordinary‖ for purposes of excluding employees from NLRA protection
encompassed directing someone else‘s daily work activities, not merely
having authority over their tangible employment status. The Court rejected
the NLRB‘s longstanding contrary view as incompatible with this ordinary
meaning. And yet, the Court concluded that the approach it adopted in
Health Care, which was separately developed and applied by the EEOC,
was unacceptably ambiguous and out of touch with workplace realities in a
Title VII setting. When the issue was whether an individual was a
―supervisor‖ for purposes of including greater protection for employees
who suffered from his conduct, the Court insisted that this individual must
have authority over tangible employment status, not simply direct and
supervise the daily activities of a fellow employee.
Inconsistent results would perhaps be understandable if in each instance
the Court had deferred to an agency determination. That there may be two
reasonable interpretations of the term ―supervisor‖ under each statutory
scheme would enable the Court to justify supporting the agency position on
each occasion. It seems harder to explain inconsistent results based on a
rejection of agency judgments, particularly judgments rendered consistently
over a long period of time in highly visible and elaborated contexts. One
possible explanation is the Court‘s growing inclination to favor employers
on these matters. Another involves the Court‘s burgeoning confidence that
it can identify and explain contested statutory terms or concepts as clear and
unambiguous, rather than obscure or inconclusive.

119. See Brief for the United States As Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 28,
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (No. 11-556), 2012 WL 3864279 (citing to
six briefs filed by EEOC).
120. See, e.g., Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 131 S. Ct. 1325, 1335
(2011); Fed. Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 399 (2008); Nashville Gas Co. v.
Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 142 n.4 (1977).
121. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 70–71 (2006)
(recognizing that retaliatory reallocation of job duties within the same position was
actionable); Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 140 (2004) (evaluating constructive
discharge claim by supervisors responsible for daily work assignments); Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 77 (1998) (recognizing supervisory authority
by two employees who had de facto control over plaintiff‘s conditions of employment); see
also Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1190–91, 1193 (2011) (applying Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act).
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III. WHY CHEVRON DEFERENCE MATTERS SO LITTLE IN THE WORKPLACE
The empirical results and doctrinal analyses presented above are not
necessarily unique to the workplace law field. At the same time, these
results and analyses call for explanations, which, while specific to
workplace law, may shed light on the complex fate of Chevron deference in
larger terms.
A. Ideology
As noted at the end of Part II, one explanation invokes ideological
factors. From the mid-1930s through the early 1990s, liberal coalitions in
both houses of Congress enacted more than a dozen major employee
protection statutes.122 Many of these laws, regulating and restricting
employers‘ business discretion in the areas of labor-management relations,
civil rights, and labor standards, were endorsed by Republican as well as
Democratic presidents.123 The three major agencies responsible for
implementation of these statutes have adopted a fairly vigorous proemployee approach (with occasional pauses or exceptions) through
rulemaking, adjudication, and less formal interpretive and guidance efforts.
On the other hand, the Court has grown steadily more conservative since
1970. In terms of its composition, Justices appointed to the Rehnquist
Court were more conservative than their Burger Court predecessors, and
Justices in the Roberts era tend to be more conservative than those from the
Rehnquist era.124 The increasingly conservative orientation is especially
visible in an ideologically charged field like workplace law, as illustrated in
voting scores compiled by Supreme Court scholar Harold Spaeth.125 Given
the direction of this ideological orientation, it is not surprising that the
Court has become less willing to endorse or defer to pro-employee agency

122. In addition to the NLRA, the three major civil rights statutes administered by the
EEOC, see supra note 32, and the seven labor standards statutes administered by the DOL,
see supra note 33, Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act, the Employee Polygraph Protection
Act, and numerous expansions or modifications of many of these statutes.
123. For example, President Nixon signed the Occupational Safety and Health Act and
the Mine Safety and Health Act; President Reagan signed the Employee Polygraph
Protection Act; and President George H.W. Bush signed the ADA, the Older Workers
Benefit Protection Act, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
124. See Martin, Quinn & Epstein, supra note 65, at 1300–04 (describing the increasing
conservatism of the Justices from the Warren to the Rehnquist Court as measured by the
partisan orientation of the median Justice); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court
at Age Three, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 947, 955–81 (2008) (describing increasing conservatism in
early years of the Roberts Court); RONALD DWORKIN, THE SUPREME COURT PHALANX: THE
COURT‘S NEW RIGHT-WING BLOC 47 (2008); Linda Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small,
Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, at A1.
125. I previously obtained an ideology score exogenous to my dataset using each Justice‘s
votes on a subgroup of civil rights, union-related, government employee, and economic
issues in the Spaeth database. For results covering Justices on the Court from the 1969 to
1970 through the 2005 to 2006 terms, see James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal
Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117, 130–31 nn.44–46 (2008). These results do not include any
votes from Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, appointed after June 2006.
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interpretations arising from the circuit-conflict settings where these
interpretations have been contested.
In addition, there is an institutional dimension to the ideology factor.
Workplace agencies are for the most part on a mission to promote collective
bargaining and to protect employee rights, as one would expect in their role
as implementers of the specific statutory directives that created them and
give them their powers. By contrast, the Supreme Court as well as lower
federal courts must integrate these statutory directives with developments in
the larger legal landscape. The NLRA is perhaps the paradigmatic example
of a statute unchanged for decades even as the political, economic, and legal
conditions that existed in the 1930s and 1940s no longer obtain. The statute
emphasizes the central value of establishing and maintaining stable
collective bargaining relationships, including addressing the free rider
problem through mechanisms to create union financial stability. But the
economic culture many decades later prefers free enterprise efficiency and
innovation over collective bargaining stability. And the legal culture has
become distinctly more individual rights oriented—both in how it promotes
a fairer distribution of economic resources126 and how it recognizes an
individual right to refrain from union membership or representation.127
In this setting, the Court may be reflecting as well as advancing an
altered set of legal norms when it refuses to defer to NLRB rulings
anchored in considerations of bargaining stability and related union
capacity.128 In similar, although perhaps less dramatic terms, the Court‘s
reluctance to defer to EEOC interpretations of Title VII and the ADEA may
reflect in part the Court‘s perspective that robust enforcement of statutory
antidiscrimination norms must be reconciled with respect for business
interests in efficiency and competitiveness. The perceived need for
accommodation arguably plays out when the Court construes statutory
language to insulate employers from attack on their putatively neutral or
settled practices related to compensation, fringe benefits, and noneconomic
aspects of the employment relationship.129

126. See generally Brudney, supra note 70, at 1568–72 (discussing Congress‘s enactment
of an array of new laws promoting and protecting individual employee rights while forsaking
renewed commitments to group action as a means of regulating the workplace).
127. See, e.g., Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int‘l Union
Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012); Chi. Teachers Union Local 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292
(1986); Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435 (1984); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
128. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359 (1998) (rejecting
considerations of bargaining stability); Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992)
(dismissing arguments in support of union access to employer workplaces); Commc‘ns
Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (declining to recognize claims for union
financial security).
129. See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (upholding
employer position on compensation); Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Ohio v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158
(1989) (sustaining employer position on fringe benefits); see also Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med.
Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013) (upholding employer position regarding other
employment conditions); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (same).
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B. Methodology
The Court may invoke agency deference selectively or strategically, just
as it does for certain other interpretive assets. Dictionaries and canons may
be more obvious targets for a cherrypicking critique, given that in the
Court‘s hands their use seems unaccompanied by basic objective
standards.130 But as Peter Strauss recently noted, ―deference‖ itself is a
highly variable concept, ranging from ―obey/accept‖ to ―respectfully
consider.‖131 When examining agency deference as a source of relevant
evidence, Skidmore virtues such as subject matter expertise, grasp of
legislative intent, and consistent application may each be respectfully
considered without being obeyed or accepted. And in Chevron terms, the
special deference associated with political accountability may be overcome
by rigorous Step One textual analysis.
As Table 1 makes clear, the Court has turned increasingly to textually
related analyses to justify its outcomes in workplace statutory cases. A
heavier reliance on dictionaries, language canons, and ordinary meaning
(and a diminished use of legislative history and purpose) results in more
decisions being based on assertedly unambiguous statutory text.132 In the
workplace law dataset, the Court‘s express refusal to defer under Chevron
invariably involves a Step One analysis.133 This Step One approach to
rejecting deference has been recognized with respect to agencies outside the
workplace law setting,134 and it is a natural corollary of the Court‘s
textualist turn. Because the turn to intensely language-based analysis has
130. On dictionaries, see James J. Brudney & Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The
Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 483 (2013); Ellen P. Aprill, The Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the
Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275 (1998); Note, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and
Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994). On canons, see Brudney &
Ditslear, supra note 24; Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085
(1995); Stephen F. Ross, Where Have You Gone Karl Llewellyn? Should Congress Turn Its
Lonely Eyes to You?, 45 VAND. L. REV. 561 (1992).
131. Peter L. Strauss, ―Deference‖ Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them ―Chevron Space‖
and ―Skidmore Weight,‖ 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012).
132. For workplace law examples beyond this Article‘s agency deference focus, see
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 557 U.S. 167 (2009); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
532 U.S. 105 (2001); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997); Mertens v. Hewitt
Associates, 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
133. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581 (2004); Barnhart v.
Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438 (2002); Lechmere, 502 U.S. 527; Dole v. United
Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26 (1990); Pittston Coal Grp. v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105
(1988).
134. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schecter Poultry at the Millennium: A Delegation
Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1399–1400 (2000) (noting that
until 1999—AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999)—the Court had never
invalidated an agency interpretation under Chevron Step Two). There is even disagreement
as to whether this 1999 case was an invalidation under Step Two. See Donald S. Dobkin, The
Rise of the Administrative State: A Prescription for Lawlessness, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y
362, 373–74 (2008) (―To date, an agency‘s decision has not been invalidated by the Supreme
Court under step two of Chevron (though several Courts of Appeal have done so).‖ (citing
STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 289–90 (5th ed.
2002))).
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been driven primarily though not exclusively by conservative Justices, the
link between Step One deference rejection and pro-employer results is
understandable if not predictable.
Moreover, the Court‘s now-prevailing appetite for close textual analysis
may have the effect of diminishing the distance between its two principal
agency deference standards. When considering the contours of an
increasingly popular Step One Chevron review, some scholars suggest that
the Court should give Skidmore deference to an agency‘s reading of the
statute.135 Agencies often have helped to draft the statutory language, and
their expert insights about original meaning seem relevant to a judicial
determination as to whether ―Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.‖136 A consistent and longstanding agency interpretation,
on which parties have relied and which the legislature has left undisturbed,
also may be probative in assessing whether Congress has unambiguously
addressed a contested statutory issue.137
Perhaps for these reasons, the Court in an early post-Chevron decision
incorporated Skidmore factors into its Step One analysis,138 and the Justices
on occasion have done so in the workplace law setting. 139 Conversely, the
Court‘s Skidmore-based refusals to defer often include reliance on the
conclusion that the agency‘s interpretation is inconsistent with or lacks
support from the plain language of the statute.140 And as the Court has
further observed, there is no reason to choose between Chevron and
Skidmore standards when it determines that an agency is either clearly right
or clearly wrong as a matter of law.141 Thus, inasmuch as the Court‘s focus
has shifted toward more extensive review of enacted text142 in an
135. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative
Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret
Statutes, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 449 (2013); Strauss, supra note 131, at 1146.
136. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
137. Eskridge, supra note 135, at 449.
138. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987) (giving agency
interpretation diminished weight for inconsistency during Step One rejection of its position).
139. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (referring to
both Chevron and Skidmore as applicable to show agency is wrong as matter of law); Dole v.
United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 34–40 (1990) (finding agency interpretation
incorrect as a matter of law based on the purpose of the Act as a whole as well as certain
language and structure, and because no exact statutory provision supports agency); see also
Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 470–71 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting
that consistent agency interpretation across different administrations is relevant for Chevron
purposes).
140. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999) (rejecting EEOC
Guidelines as inconsistent with letter as well as spirit of ADA); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991) (rejecting EEOC interpretation as lacking support in plain
language of statute, as well as not being contemporaneous or consistent with prior
interpretations); Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60 (1986) (rejecting EEOC
Guidelines as inconsistent with plain meaning of statute).
141. See Gen. Dynamics, 540 U.S. at 600 (agency clearly wrong); Edelman v. Lynchburg
Coll., 535 U.S. 106, 114 (2002) (agency clearly right).
142. The turn to textualism does not mean that reliance on legislative history or purpose
has disappeared. These resources remain relevant both to Chevron Step One analysis and
when considering Skidmore expertise.
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increasingly successful hunt for unambiguous meaning, this focus may
result in differences between deference standards becoming of lesser
importance to its review process.
C. Institutional Relations
Finally, the counterintuitive patterns of lesser deference for the NLRB
under Chevron than for the EEOC under Skidmore may be in part
attributable to the contrast between the Board‘s prolonged isolation from
Congress and the EEOC‘s continuing integration with the legislative
branch. Following longstanding legislative gridlock, engineered by labor
and management as powerful interest groups, Congress has failed to update
the NLRA since 1959. This remarkable period of congressional inaction
has left the NLRB on a political island, lacking the full accountability status
envisioned under Chevron.143 Of particular relevance, because all efforts to
amend the NLRA in either labor or management directions have failed to
garner necessary supermajority support,144 the accountability inherent in a
congressional override for failure to defer is entirely absent. The Court has
little to fear by yielding to its conservative inclinations on reasonably
contested issues, thereby limiting the NLRA‘s scope of protections for
collective bargaining and related employee rights.
By contrast, Congress regularly revisits and updates the mandates and
policy directives governing EEOC operations.145 Indeed, from 1980 to
2009, Congress often overrode conservative Court decisions in the
employment discrimination area, primarily those interpreting Title VII but
also decisions construing the ADEA and the ADA.146 From the standpoint

143. See generally Brudney, supra note 14.
144. Unsuccessful efforts at reform on the union side have foundered in the Senate, due to
the failure to secure sixty votes to end a filibuster. See Labor Law Reform Act, S. 2467, 95th
Cong. (1978); Workplace Fairness Act, S. 55, 102d Cong. (1992); Employee Free Choice
Act, S. 1041, 110th Cong. (2007). Efforts at management-side reform died when proponents
lacked the two-thirds support in either chamber to override a veto by President Clinton. See
Teamwork for Employees and Managers Act of 1995, H.R. 743, 104th Cong. (1996).
145. For examples involving Title VII since 1964, see Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103; Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076; Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071;
and Lily Ledbetter Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5. For examples involving Age
Discrimination in Employment Act since 1967, see ADEA Amendments of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189; ADEA Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, 100 Stat. 3342;
and the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978.
For examples involving disability law, see Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2012) and the ADA Amendments of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325,
122 Stat. 3553.
146. See Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge Jr., Congressional Overrides of
Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 1967–2011, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1317, 1356–
60 (2014) (reporting that antidiscrimination laws are a regular focus of successful
congressional override activity, whereas labor law is virtually absent from the dataset of
statutory overrides). For notable examples of statutes overriding Supreme Court decisions
that construed antidiscrimination laws, see 1976 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 1978 ADEA
Amendments, 1990 Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 1991 Civil Rights Act, 2008
ADA Amendments, and 2009 Lily Ledbetter Act.
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of institutional self-protection, the Court may well feel a need to pay more
attention to EEOC interpretations.147 This attentiveness is based not on the
agency‘s rule of law standing as specified in one statute versus another.
Instead, it derives from the agency‘s connection to the policy preferences of
contemporary Congresses. Because the EEOC‘s political accountability is
essentially being renewed in both branches, the Court is more likely to be
punished for failing to defer.
That is not to say the Court is unwilling to reject EEOC positions for
ideological reasons, or that it will not invoke Skidmore to help explain its
reluctance to defer in specific cases. Since Congress enacted large-scale
overrides of the Court‘s civil rights statutory interpretations in 1990 and
1991, the Court has declined to defer to the agency in eight of thirteen
cases, and its rulings favored employers in six of those eight decisions.148
Still, Congress has overridden several post-1991 Court decisions favoring
employers; two others are so recent it may be too early to know whether
Congress will react to them.149 In the end, the fact that the EEOC has
received a higher level of deference since 1984 than it did in the prior
fifteen years, notwithstanding the arrival of an ever-more conservative
Court, suggests that there may be some residual respect for the combined
weight of the politically accountable branches.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown that Chevron‘s role as a deference-triggering
norm has not come close to fulfilling initial expectations in the workplace
law field. Over three decades, the Court has often relied on pro-employer
ideological preferences and a passion for rigorous textual analysis to
undermine its embrace of the putatively game-changing Chevron standard.
Support for NLRB determinations has declined noticeably since Chevron,
even though the Court remains formally committed to broader deference.
147. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 115 (1991) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (―In the domain of statutory interpretation, Congress is the master. It obviously
has the power to correct our mistakes, but we do the country a disservice when we
needlessly ignore persuasive evidence of Congress‘s actual purpose and require it ‗to take
the time to revisit the matter‘ and to restate its purpose in more precise English whenever its
work product suffers from an omission or inadvertent error.‖ (footnote omitted)). Congress
overrode the result in Casey within several months of Stevens‘ dissenting observation, as
part of the 1991 Civil Rights Act. See also Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes,
EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (No. 89-1838) (Jan. 18, 1991) (on file with the Library of
Congress, Manuscript Division, Harry A. Blackmun Papers: Box 572) (reporting that Justice
O‘Connor, who voted with the majority to affirm the lower court ruling against
extraterritorial application of Title VII, stated ―Congress would extend coverage if we
[affirm]. Useful to have Congress look at it‖). Congress overrode the result in Arabian
American within several months as well, also as part of the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
148. For decisions in addition to Vance in which the Court has favored employers while
refusing to defer to the EEOC, see, for example, University of Texas Southwest Medical
Center v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550
U.S. 618 (2007); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
149. Congress has overridden Ledbetter (in 2009 with the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act,
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5) and Sutton (in 2008 by the ADA Amendments Act, Pub. L.
No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3552). Vance and Nassar were decided in June 2013.

526

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

With respect to DOL interpretations, there is evidence that Step Zero
analysis has influenced Chevron applicability but there are also ample
instances of refusals to defer based on Chevron Step One review.
Ironically, the judicial deference record under Skidmore has been
somewhat more positive since Chevron when reviewing agency
interpretations of federal antidiscrimination statutes. To be clear, the
invocation of Skidmore or Skidmore-type factors has hardly resulted in
robust respect for agency determinations. Further, to the extent that the
Justices have been prepared to defer to EEOC judgments, the most
persuasive explanation may be that Congress‘s continuing willingness to
override anti-agency pro-employer interpretations acts as a restraint on the
current Court‘s ideological and methodological proclivities.
Workplace law is only one area of federal statutory development, and it
is more ideologically polarizing than some others. Still, the findings that
Chevron has had limited impact are supported by other scholarly work
covering a wider range of subject matter.150 The past need not be prologue
with respect to the impact of the Chevron approach: the Court‘s ideological
composition may change, and in addition the current cycle of heavy reliance
on textual analysis may give way to a more purposive interpretive
orientation.151 For now, though, the levels of agency deference under both
Chevron and Skidmore seem likely to remain quite limited, and well below
the aspirations of Chevron enthusiasts.

150. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 25; Miles & Sunstein, supra note 68; Raso &
Eskridge, supra note 68.
151. See, e.g., NLRB v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2561 (2014) (―The constitutional text
is thus ambiguous. And we believe the Clause‘s purpose demands the broader
interpretation.‖); Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504 (2014)
(―Considered alone, the language of the Act does not clearly indicate when an entity
‗perform[s]‘ (or ‗transmit[s]‘) and when it merely supplies equipment that allows others to
do so. But when read in light of its purpose, the Act is unmistakable. . . .‖). See Koons
Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65–66 (2004) (Stevens, J., concurring) (―In
recent years the Court has suggested that we should only look at legislative history for the
purpose of resolving textual ambiguities or to avoid absurdities. It would be wiser to
acknowledge that it is always appropriate to consider all available evidence of Congress‘[s]
true intent when interpreting its work product. Common sense is often more reliable than
rote repetition of canons of statutory construction. It is unfortunate that wooden reliance on
those canons has led to unjust results from time to time. Fortunately, today the Court has
provided us with a lucid opinion that reflects the sound application of common sense.‖
(footnote omitted)).

